Showing posts with label sense. Show all posts
Showing posts with label sense. Show all posts

Sunday, June 01, 2008

Howard Wettstein, "Has Semantics Rested on a Mistake?"

Frege's criterion of adequacy for semantic theory is that it register differences of cognitive significance. New theories of reference do not meet Frege's criterion of adequacy, and attempts by new theorists like Kaplan and Perry to satisfy the criterion by employing "character" or "role" fail to do justice to Frege's data. The proper response for new theorists of reference is to reject Frege's criterion of adequacy. Belief reports do not favor either Fregeans or new theorists.

Friday, September 29, 2006

Gareth Evans, "Understanding Demonstratives"

Evans has multiple projects in this paper. First is a reply to Perry's criticism of Frege on Demonstratives that involves denying that Frege is limited to descriptive senses. Evans thinks that Perry's argument requires the assumption that Frege is only entitled to such senses. Second, Evans sketches a view of object-dependent, non-descriptive Fregean senses in order to make good on his claim that Frege is entitled to such things. Third, Evans introduces the notion of a dynamic thought, which can persist through changes in time and linguistic expression. Fourth, Evans claims that Perry's account of the objects of the propositional attitudes (roughly, Russellian propositions apprehended under linguistic roles) is just a "notational variant" of Frege's proposal (or the proposal that Evans attributes to Frege). Fifth, Evans says that we need to embed our understanding of "ways of being presented" with an object in a general theory of thought, which will explain the special way subjects apprehend themselves in first-personal thought, or how they think about time, or about a place. Perry, he claims, fails to give such an account when he claims that the linguistic, token-reflexive rule governing uses of "I" or "here" or "now" gives us a way of thinking about how the objects these terms pick out are presented to us.

Wednesday, September 27, 2006

Thomas Kuhn, "Commensurability, Comparability, Communicability"

Translation must preserve sense or intension, not just reference; portions of two languages are incommensurable when they canot be intertranslated without residue or loss.

Monday, September 25, 2006

Richard Heck, "Do Demonstratives Have Senses?"

The naive conception of communication--that speaker and addressee have to share the same thought to successfully communicate--is indefensible; it should be replaced with a conception of communication that involves speaker and addressee sharing appropriately related thoughts.