Pär Segerdahl, Language Use, Chapter 13, "Intentions and Beliefs as Conditions for Use"

The picture of language according to which external, lifeless signs need to be supplemented by inner processes, like belief or intention, is a misleading picture. Words have significance in use, and the need for a theory of speaker intentions is occasioned by nothing more than the misleading picture of external, lifeless marks and sounds.

Pär Segerdahl, Language Use, Ch.8, "Rationality as a Basis for Language Use"

Grice's cooperative maxims and conception of the rational norms governing conversation are meant to explain our ordinary practices of understanding sentences; but the maxims and conversational norms themselves depend on those very practices for their intelligibility. For example, the notion of cooperation requires some particular, concrete practice (like work in a repair shop) in order to have any content. It doesn't make sense to say that there is some general, practice-independent notion of cooperativeness that governs our understanding of speakers' utterances.

Ian Rumfitt, "Truth Conditions and Communication"

Neither communication-intention nor truth-conditional semantic approaches to understanding meaning are sufficient; adopting a hybrid account that incorporates elements of both traditions is essential to giving an account of the basic act of putting a thought forward, or understanding a thought expressed by a declarative utterance.

P.F. Strawson, "Meaning and Truth"

In the Homeric struggle that is the theory of meaning, communication-intention theorists have the edge over the formal semanticists.

H.P. Grice and P.F. Strawson, "In Defense of a Dogma"

Quine's attack on the analytic-synthetic distinction relies on an unacceptable standard of clarity; accepting the standard would rule out all kinds of useful concepts like "means the same as".

Jerrold M. Sadock, "On Testing for Conversational Implicature"

Grice's tests for whether something counts as conversational implicature vs. conventional implicature--calculability, cancellability, and detachability--are not singly or jointly sufficient to determine whether an implicature is conversational.