Norman Malcolm, "Defending Common Sense"

Moore's reply to the skeptic, to simply claim that he knows that this is a hand, or that he knows he is a human being, is mistaken because it assumes that saying "I know this is a hand" or "I know I am a human being" makes more sense than "I don't know this is a hand" or "I don't know I'm a human being". The proper response to the skeptic is to say that neither the assertion nor the denial that one knows that this is a hand makes sense (in a philosophical context).

Avner Baz, "Who Knows"

Contextualism fails to appreciate the insights of ordinary language philosophy and so does not advance our understanding of what knowledge is.

Michael Brady and Duncan Pritchard, "Epistemological Contextualism: Problems and Prospects"

An overview of the history and current state of play in debates about epistemological contextualism.

Keith deRose, "Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions"

Defends contextualism about knowledge ascriptions against the criticism that it seems absurd to say that one can truly say in context 1 that one knows that one saw zebras at the zoo, and then in context 2 truly say that one didn't (doesn't?) know that one saw zebras at the zoo by insisting that knowledge ascriptions function like indexicals. One can truly say, in context 1, that one knows, and then truly say in context 2 that one didn't know without contradicting oneself.

Comment: This seems more plausible when there IS a difference in some kind of indexical element, like the tense---it sounds better (though not great) to say, "I knew then that that I saw a zebra" and "Now I don't know whether I saw a zebra or just a painted mule".

Michael Dummett, "What Do I Know When I Know a Language?"

A speaker has implicit knowledge of a meaning theory for a language he knows.