Noam Chomsky, "Language and Interpretation"

Chomsky criticizes central philosophical accounts of what constraints should apply to the study of language: Quine's behaviorism, Davidson's demand that we explain communication, and Dummett's claims about public language. None of these notions are compatible with the actual scientific investigation of language.

Sören Stenlund, Language and Philosophical Problems, Chapter 2: "Notions of Language and Theories of Meaning"

There are two approaches to the study of meaning: an a priori approach, concerned with the "conceptual" conditions for the possibility of meaning (exemplified by Frege and the early Wittgenstein), and an empirical, naturalistic, approach, which dominates contemporary discussions of meaning. The naturalistic approach, while suitable for certain kinds of limited clarifications, when applied to fundamental questions about the nature of language and meaning, produces confusions. The basic mistake of the empirical approach is to assume that expressions of ordinary language have sense independently of the practices in which they are used. And the practices in which expressions are used are fundamental; they can't be explained in more basic terms. Any attempted explanation will presuppose what it tries to explain.

Michael Dummett, "What Do I Know When I Know a Language?"

A speaker has implicit knowledge of a meaning theory for a language he knows.

Michael Dummett, "A Defense of McTaggart's Proof of the Unreality of Time"

McTaggart's argument doesn't in fact establish that time is unreal; instead, it establishes that there is no absolute conception of reality, since reality contains temporal facts--facts only available from particular temporal points of view.

Karen Green, "What Do We Know When We Understand a Language?" in Michael Dummett

Language is a shared social institution that we can have better and worse knowledge of; Davidson's arguments based on malapropisms don't show that language doesn't have a shared structure.