Wednesday, November 29, 2006

David Velleman, "The Centered Self"

Our drive to know what we're doing makes it possible for us to have effective intentions and to give others reliable reasons to think that we will do what we say we will. This helps explain how mutual declarations of intention can help us escape the prisoner's dilemma.

Galen Strawson, "Against Narrativity"

Human beings do not, and should not, understand themselves in narrative terms.

Amir D. Aczel, Descartes's Secret Notebook

Descartes had ties with the Rosicrucians (if he wasn't one himself), and he made discoveries in topology that he has only recently been credited with.

Wednesday, November 15, 2006

David Velleman, "Self to Self"

Draws a distinction between a psychological notion of self and the metaphysical notion of a person. What we're interested in in splitting cases is not survival, but psychological continuity of a special kind.

For a more detailed commentary on this article, see the philosophy of mind workshop.

Monday, November 13, 2006

Crispin Wright, "Rule-Following, Objectivity and the Theory of Meaning"

Asks whether a Davidson-style t-theory for a language is compatible with Wittgenstein's reflections on rule-following. Answers that it is, so long as it is a description of a part of the language knowledge of which would enable someone to participate in that part of the language.

Friday, November 10, 2006

Friedrich Waismann, "Verifiability"

No set of observation sentences entails a material object sentence. This is partly due to the "open texture" of material object sentences: rules for their application are not bounded on all sides, but are porous, leaving some applications open, not yet decided.

Tuesday, November 07, 2006

Jeff King, "Context Dependent Quantifiers and Donkey Anaphora"

Explains the basic motivation for context dependent quantifiers, applies them to donkey anaphora, and argues that the CDQ approach has certain methodological advantages over its competitors.