Michael Brady and Duncan Pritchard, "Epistemological Contextualism: Problems and Prospects"

An overview of the history and current state of play in debates about epistemological contextualism.

Keith deRose, "Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions"

Defends contextualism about knowledge ascriptions against the criticism that it seems absurd to say that one can truly say in context 1 that one knows that one saw zebras at the zoo, and then in context 2 truly say that one didn't (doesn't?) know that one saw zebras at the zoo by insisting that knowledge ascriptions function like indexicals. One can truly say, in context 1, that one knows, and then truly say in context 2 that one didn't know without contradicting oneself.

Comment: This seems more plausible when there IS a difference in some kind of indexical element, like the tense---it sounds better (though not great) to say, "I knew then that that I saw a zebra" and "Now I don't know whether I saw a zebra or just a painted mule".

Herman Cappelen and Ernie Lepore, "On an Alleged Connection Between Indirect Speech and the Theory of Meaning"

The mistaken assumption (MA) shared by almost all semantics is that indirect reports of what is said are relevant to the semantic content of sentences. Reports of what is said are deeply context sensitive (both to features of the context of utterance and to features of the reporting context), whereas semantic content is supposed to reflect context-invariant features of linguistic activity.

Alain de Botton, The Architecture of Happiness

Sensible but unsurprising and slightly pretentious guide to how architecture and design can influence our lives for good or ill.

John Perry, "Reflexivity, Indexicality and Names"

There is not a single propreitary notion of content or truth conditions; there are many different notions that are useful for different purposes.

Ian Rumfitt, "Truth Conditions and Communication"

Neither communication-intention nor truth-conditional semantic approaches to understanding meaning are sufficient; adopting a hybrid account that incorporates elements of both traditions is essential to giving an account of the basic act of putting a thought forward, or understanding a thought expressed by a declarative utterance.

Francois Recanati, "Predelli and Carpintero on Literal Meaning"

Recanati's primary opponent in Literal Meaning is the minimalist, who argues that the only role of context in the determination of truth conditional content is to give values to conventionally, linguistically encoded sentence elements (indexicals, e.g.); he tries to show that that isn't enought to account for all the uses of sentences with intuitive truth conditional contents (loosening, metonymy, semantic extension, etc.).

Michael Pelczar, "Wittgensteinian Semantics"

The family resemblance of philosophical expressions like 'knows' or 'causes' can be explained in terms of a conjunction of 'topical indexicality', which is a characteristic of terms with a single meaning but variable contents depending on the situations in which they are used, and 'semantic openness', which is a characteristic of expressions that leave room for discretion in their application. If philosophical expressions are topically indexical, then the method of finding counterexamples for analyses of 'knows', for example, is a completely wrongheaded approach to doing philosophy (as is the activity of refining analyses).

Jonathan Berg, "Is Semantics Still Possible?"

The standard view of semantics, that every disambiguated sentence has a determinate semantic content, relative to an assignment of contexts to its indexical expressions, and not necessarily identical to what may be conveyed (pragmatically) by its utterance, is not threatened by contextualist attacks; semantics may be concerned with a "strict notion" of what is said, whereas the contextualists are concerned with a "loose notion". Showing that the loose notion is contextually sensitive does not show that the strict notion is. The only real threat to traditional semantics would be an alternative theory that explains semantic phenomena better.